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In this paper we analyze an unacknowledged tension in decision making about the 
distribution of resources for research and innovation.   There is tension because while 
decision makers accept that there is inequality in research performance, and that 
resources should be distributed according to merit, the resulting inequality in the 
allocation of public money seems so extreme that it violates deeply held principles of 
equity in a democratic society.  We will pursue this argument by considering how 
resources and performance are distributed.  Specifically we will examine the properties of 
probability distributions – power law and normal – and the felt experience of “living 
within” these distributions. 
 
The argument proceeds as follows.  The paper begins by discussing the distinctions 
commonly made between probability distributions and then proposes a metaphorical 
classification of the shape of distributions.  There follows a review of the empirical 
evidence that a power law distribution characterizes research performance.  Next, equity 
in the merit-based distribution of resources is discussed and recent results from 
experimental economics are brought to bear on the question of the felt experience of 
resource distribution.  This is used to argue that the normal distribution of resources will 
feel more comfortable than the power law distribution of resources both to those 
distributing resources and to those receiving resources.  Unfortunately, we find that in 
research the comfortable distribution of resources creates an incentive structure that may 
suppress excellence.   
 
We believe there is a fundamental tension in between equity and excellence that can 
suppress incentives for excellence in innovation when equity is a concern in distributing 
resources.  Although using merit based evaluation as a criterion for research funding 
would seem likely to resolve this tension, we argue here that this is not the case.  Merit 
based decision making alone is insufficient because of inequity aversion, a fundamental 
tendency of people to avoid extremely unequal distributions.  The distribution of 
performance in innovation is extremely unequal, and no decision maker with the power to 
establish a distribution of public money among recipients would dare to match that level 
of inequality.  In fact, decision makers are likely unaware of the issue, as they no doubt 
operate with distributional assumptions of normality that guide our everyday intuitions.   
 
Further research is needed to ascertain how best to resolve the tension, though innovative 
funding mechanisms such as prizes hold promise.  Second, avoiding a system in which 
one decision maker or decision making committee makes a comprehensive allocation of 
resources may help.  The U.S. exemplifies this situation in that the total Federal research 
support received by any state, university or department is allocated through many 
competitive decisions each of comparatively minor consequence.  It is possible that many 
small, inequity averse, merit based decisions may accumulate into a distribution that 
provides innovators with appropriate incentives.  However, further research is needed to 
confirm this point. 
 
